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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2543 
___________ 
 
TYRELL TAYLOR HINES, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JOHN DOE, Operations and Shift Commander, Allentown, PD; 
JOSEPH STAUFFER, Prosecutor; CHRISTOPHER CRUZ, Detective Supervisor;  
JOHN GILL, Lead Detective; AMY SORIN, Public Defender;  
KATHRYN R. SMITH, Public Defender; GARRY GLASCOM,  
CHARLES BANTA, Court Appointed Attorney; MARIA L. DANTOS, Judge 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 5-15-cv-02628) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mark A. Kearney 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
November 5, 2015 
Before:  CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR. and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: December 7, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Tyrell Hines appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  Because this appeal presents no substantial 
question, we will affirm. 
 Hines is a Pennsylvania state prisoner who was convicted for possession and 
distribution of narcotics.  He brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various 
individuals who were involved with the search of his home, his subsequent arrest and 
criminal trial.  He brought a claim against two detectives and a member of the Allentown 
Police Department staff, alleging that their role in the search of his property and 
subsequent arrest violated his constitutional rights.  He also brought claims against the 
Judge who presided over his criminal trial, the Deputy District Attorney who prosecuted 
him, and the four defense attorneys who represented him in his criminal trial. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s order where there is no substantial question presented by the 
appeal.  Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.   
 This appeal presents no substantial question.  The District Court correctly 
dismissed Hines’ claims against the Judge and the Deputy District Attorney because they 
benefit from absolute immunity.  See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) 
(holding that judges have immunity from suit for judicial acts); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 
U.S. 409, 423-28 (1976) (holding that prosecutors have immunity from suit for actions 
within the scope of their prosecutorial duties).  The Court correctly dismissed Hines’ 
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claims against his defense attorneys because they are not state actors.  See West v. 
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (holding that to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff 
must allege that the deprivation of a constitutional right was committed by a person 
acting under color of state law).1  Finally, the Court correctly dismissed Hines’ claims 
against the detectives and police staff to the extent that he complains of their statements 
as witnesses in his criminal trial, because witnesses enjoy absolute immunity.  Briscoe v. 
LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 345-46 (1983). 
 The District Court also correctly concluded that his claims against the detectives 
and police staff were barred by the two-year statute of limitations in Pennsylvania.  
Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, a district court may sua 
sponte dismiss a complaint under § 1915(e) as untimely where the defense is obvious 
from the complaint and no development of the factual record is required.  See Fogle v. 
Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir.2006); Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 
656-57 (4th Cir.2006); Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir.2001); 
Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir.1995).  The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims 
is governed by limitations period for state law personal injury claims.  See Wallace v. 
Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007).   In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations is two years from 
the date the claim accrued.  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2).  Hines filed this civil action 
                                              
1 It appears from the complaint that Hines was trying to bring a Sixth Amendment claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel against his defense attorneys.  This is not a cognizable 
claim under § 1983; however, we dismiss this appeal without prejudice.  Hines may 
therefore bring such a claim in the context of a habeas petition. 
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in 2015, but he states in his complaint that the search of his house and subsequent arrests 
took place in 2012.  Hines was therefore time-barred from bringing his claims against 
these Appellees.   
 As this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm. 
 
